The Epigenic Paradox within Social Development

Robert Kowalski

Abstract

The paper explores the Epigenic Paradox wherein agents of development are inextricable tangled up in the social systems that they both inhabit and co-create. Furthermore, Paulo Freire had maintained that the oppressed should be self-emancipated, which generates a most perplexing paradox of development; the primacy of the individual agent or the social structure? Simply put there is a dynamic relationship between person and group in which each exists by virtue of the other in a dialectical interchange. Thus an individual or agent is momentarily able to act in ways that maintain the social structures or indeed that call their existence into question, but then has been and is subject to the influence of those very social structures.

Moreover, this paradox finds further expression in the concepts of identity, labeling and stigma. The latter two become substantial issues in regard to the impact that the protagonists of development can have on the marginalized. This management of stigma is further complicated by the imposed requirement on the labeled to respond to their situation and to interact with the agents of 'benevolence' and yet strive to avoid giving endorsement thereby to the labeling bestowed by those significant others. It is not hard to conclude that for an indigenous change agent to emerge from amongst the marginalised is an almost impossibly demanding mission.

The link between self-emancipation and the definition of development as the promotion of autonomy and self-determination is discussed. Leading to the idea of spreading the values of civil liberties, the rule of law, democracy, and good governance. So the concept of a 'developed' country is becoming more and more synonymous with a 'democratic' country, and 'development' has been in many ways supplanted by 'democratization'. However, the true paradox of democracy is that a democracy can only be sustained in the face of alternative social configurations by the willingness of individuals to forego their individual interest in favour of the group interest.

Introduction

Amongst the various paradoxes that bedevil the development assistance (DA) business Kowalski (2010; 2012b) drew attention to what he named the Epigenic Paradox. This paper seeks to elucidate that paradox and the various issues that relate to it.

In addition to those considerations surrounding the moral hazard of receiv-

ing aid there is also a corresponding hazard for the giver. When the helper has an interest in finding opportunities to be helpful it can generate imprudent behaviour leading to increases in the number of cases necessitating assistance, a manifestation of Say's Law applied to development assistance, where: "the presence of the offer of aid then *creates* a new scenario where the problematic situations are partly incentivized by the aid offer. The order of causality is reversed." (Ellerman, 2005, p.113). In fact the development professionals are also caught in a double-bind that is this moral hazard in reverse – because, like the recipients of DA, they are themselves dependent upon the continuing dependence of the recipient, for if the recipient were to become truly independent – capable of self-help – then the 'external' helper would no longer be necessary. The helpers cannot withdraw from helping, particularly since they have an imperative to 'get money out the door', nor can they comment upon the paradox to which they are party (Tendler, 1975; Kowalski, 2004). The fable of the emperor's new suit of clothes is entirely the nature of this double-bind in which professionals find themselves.

Thus we should recognise that the dependence of donor staff and agents and all the other ways in which the developed world is dependent upon the recipients of DA is not included in the analyses of the prevailing situation – and largely remains 'outside' the deliberations of what can be done to improve the existing state of affairs. This involves the misperception of development professionals that they are external to and detached from the system that they are analysing or into which they are designing interventions. As Scruton (1996, p.22) observed: "We encounter here … an enduring paradox. It seems that we describe the world in two quite different ways – as the world that *contains* us, and as the world on which we act." and Koestler (1967, p.245) emphasised that: "It is a paradox as old as Achilles and the Tortoise, that the experiencing subject can never fully become the object of [their] experience" and conversely that they can never exclude themselves from their role in creating the world they observe.

Moreover, this leads to a complicated relationship that Stacey (2001, p.42) defined as:

> the agency-structure debate, [where] the term agency refers to the capacity of the individual human for making choices and taking action on their choices. It refers to the freedom of the individual to act and denotes those causes of human action to be found in the individual. Structure refers to the causes of human actions to be found in society, institutions, organizations and groups. Social structure is defined as the pattern of recurring relations between people in their ongoing dealings with each other, usually those that are repetitive and

enduring, although some writers include ephemeral contacts between people in their definition of social structure.

Which highlights that paradox of development wherein individuals are inextricable tangled up in the social systems that they both inhabit and co-create causing them inevitably to be less free and self-efficacious than they imagine or indeed than is imputed to them (Hayek, 2007), and which has been termed the Epigenic Paraodox (Kowalski, 2010).

The Structural Paradox of Individual and Society

All the protagonists of development are caught up in this entanglement of epigenesis (Kowalski, 2007). As Stacey (2001, p.101) noted: "All human action is history dependent. … Actions are patterned by both previous history and current context", so that we can only start our journey from where we find ourselves. In addition to the agents of the donors (of whatever persuasion) being unable to think themselves into the parameters of their own analyses, the objects of development are also unwittingly enmeshed in their own circumstances. As Rodrik (2011, p.172) noted: "Telling poor countries in Africa or Latin America that they should set their sights on the institutions of the United States or Sweden is like telling them that the only way to develop is to become developed." Indeed, Lewis (1964, p. xxiv), in his seminal study of poverty in Mexico, noted that: "[poverty] has a structure, a rationale, and defence mechanisms without which the poor could hardly carry on. In short, it is a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation", which he termed a 'Culture of Poverty'. To be sure, Freire (1971, p.48) had also recognised this encompassing structure when he stated that: "the oppressed are not 'marginals', are not men living 'outside' society. They have always been 'inside' – inside the structure that made them 'beings for others'. The solution is not to 'integrate' them into the structure of oppression but to transform the structure so they can become 'beings for themselves'." and Seabrook (1988, p.168) captured what it is to be marginalised in a society that has been constructed by and for others when he noted that: "the poor do not inhabit a separate culture from the rich: they must live in the same world that has been contrived for the benefit of those with money."

Furthermore, Paulo Freire had posited: "the absolute necessity that the oppressed be self-emancipated rather than 'led' on the basis of struggles around their immediate interests by an avant-garde of revolutionary intellectuals."

(Aronowitz, 1993, p.15), which appears to run contrary to the earlier expressed views of Kant (1991, p.55) who had maintained that: "There is more chance of an entire public enlightening itself. This is indeed almost inevitable, if only the public is left in freedom. For there will always be a few who think for themselves, even among those appointed as guardians of the common mass.", which Cole (2005, p.47) reaffirmed when he said that: "Development theorists have to assume an activist role, facilitating people's awareness of the evolving social parameters of their experience, as a step towards people's participation in the social control of their existence in order to realize their particular potentials: praxis."

Furthermore, Aronowitz (1993, p.16), highlighted the challenge of: "the antinomy of populism and vanguardism" in reference to the contradiction between Freirian theory and the experience that actions for development have been largely initiated by sympathetic (sic) representatives of the 'oppressors' rather than the 'oppressed' themselves. Furthermore, Rahnema (1992 p.125) commented on this tension when he wrote that: "[There is a] necessity for 'progressive' groups of non-alienated intellectuals to transcend their class interests and to engage in conscientization exercises." Indeed, Benton (1981, p.162) had alluded to a 'paradox of emancipation' that ensures that: "if emancipation is to be brought about, it cannot be self-emancipation." Again, Rahnema (1992, p.125) highlighted the dangers that emerge from such a paradox by warning that frequently: "[Such] Agents of change … have tried to use conscientization or participatory methods, simply as new and more subtle forms of manipulation."

This brings us to the need to consider this perplexing paradox of development, that of the primacy of the individual agent or the social structure, which is linked to those issues of free will and agency discussed by Kowalski (2012b). Sheldrake (1988, p.58) referred to it as: "the paradox of all material forms. The form is in one sense united with matter, but the form aspect and the material aspect are also separable." Indeed, Hodgson (2007, p.95) captured such a core paradox when he noted that: "The relationship between social structure and individual agency is one of the central problems of social theory." and explained it as: "institutions are simultaneously both objective structures 'out there', and subjective springs of human *agency* 'in the human head'. Institutions are in this respect like Klein bottles: the subjective 'inside' is simultaneously the objective 'outside'." (ibid. p.108;).

Accordingly, Ollman (1993, p.89) had asked: "how people can make their own history and be made by it at the same time, how we are both free and conditioned, and how the future is both open and necessary", and Bauman

(2000, p.30) had observed that: "Society [is] shaping the individuality of its members, and the individuals [are] forming society out of their life actions while pursuing strategies plausible and feasible within the socially woven web of their dependencies." Leading Cole (2005, p.49) to ask: "Which comes first: the (human) egg or the (social) chicken? Each is the condition and effect of the other in a perpetual process of evolution of what potentially is". Indeed Korten (2006, p.152) made a similar observation that: "if the wise state is a product of a wise citizenry, and a wise citizenry is the product of a wise state, which comes first?" For, as Sen (1999, p.xii) had recognised: "There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements."

When Archer (1995, p.72) explained that: "This is the human condition, to be born into a social context (of language, beliefs and organization) which was not of our making." she was capturing a conundrum that others had commented on before, for example Einstein (1998: p.3) had asserted that: "The individual is able to think, feel, strive, and work by himself; but he depends so much upon society — in his physical, intellectual, and emotional existence — that it is impossible to think of him, or to understand him, outside the framework of society." In fact, May (1974, p.226) had declared that: "Continually through human history and through the life-span of each one of us, there goes on this dialectical process between individual and society, person and group, man and community … It is a dynamic relationship in which each pole exists by virtue of the other pole".

So, how can we understand this manifestation of recursive self-reference that is at the very core of the human social condition? Within structuration theory Anthony Giddens saw actors and structures as two sides of the same coin with neither having ontological priority over the other (Craib, 1992). Whereas critical realists conceive of structure as an emergent property of the interactions of individuals, and therefore at a higher logical level (Bhaskar, 2002). Nonetheless Stacey and Griffin (2005, p.15) sought to rule out the confusion of different logical levels as an explanation of the epigenic paradox when they averred that:

> there is no notion of individuals at one level and social structures at another. Individual minds/selves paradoxically form the social while being formed by the social at the same time… human reality is the temporally iterated interaction between human bodies so that any concept of a whole is an imaginative construct arising in that interaction, giving a sense of unity, coherence and continuity to experience.

It is noteworthy that Stacey and Griffin (2005, p. 16.) had recognized that: "A social object … does not exist as a thing (physical object) but as a generalized tendency on the part of large numbers of people to act in similar ways in similar

situations." Indeed, Bhaskar (2002, p.114) has noted that: "of course there is social structure, but it is a property of a series of human acts. It is not an entity".

Such considerations led Stacey, (2001, p.173) to take recourse to the role of time in generating the paradox by suggesting that: "It is in th[e] living present that the future is perpetually being constructed…. The forming present.. signif[ies] the time structure of forming while being formed at the same time as the inclusion of the past and the future in the experience of the present." which, in reference to the role of time in a bell circuit, Bateson (2002, p.55) had similarly explained as: "The *if … then* of causality [of the bell circuit] contains time, but the *if … then* of logic is timeless. It follows that logic is an incomplete model of causality."

Thus an agent is momentarily able to act in ways that maintain the social structures (in development terms Policies, Institutions and Processes (PIPs) (Carney, 1998)) or that call their existence into question, but then has been and is subject to the influence of those very social structures. Furthermore, the nature of this relationship between the individual and the emergent social structure contains the possibility of another paradoxical dimension, for as Searle (1995, p.57) recognised: "each use of the institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users to the institution", which affirmation helps the structure and its influence to become more substantial and more difficult for individuals to transgress, even though the intention behind such use may be directed towards weakening the institution. Thus directing aid via NGOs strengthens only those which receive funds as well as undermining the legitimacy of organs of the state, and contrariwise.

But where and what is this virtual structure that influences such interactions in the here and now and how does it shape relating in the living present? Sheldrake (1988), in his hypothesis of morphic resonance, had suggested that all living things are born into a universe ordered by morphic fields (structures that are the organising principles) that are the result of the accumulation of all previous experiences of the morphogenesis of their kind, which both facilitate and shape the individual's development whilst allowing both novelty as well as genotypic and phenotypic variations. Which in itself is strongly reminiscent of the views of Giddens (1982, p.35) who spoke of: "recursively organized rules and resources" and structure which: "exists only in a virtual way, as memory traces and as the instantiation of rules in the situated activities of agents" (Giddens, 1989, p.256), that left human beings to be: "reflective of, and reactive to, their circumstances, as well as being constrained by them." (Hodgson, 2007, p.103).

Thus, Stacey (2001, p.43) related that: "Closely linked to the ideas of social structure, institutions and organizations are the notions of habits, customs,

traditions, routines, mores, values, cultures, paradigms, beliefs, missions and visions. These are all ideas about the repetitive, enduring, shared practices of people in their ongoing dealings with each other in institutional life." Moreover, Mohan (2011, p.10) had recognised that: "Culture after all is a pattern of learned behaviors that we inherit and pass on to posterity." Indeed, Hodgson (2007, p.106) emphasised that: "institutions work only because the rules involved are embedded in prevalent habits of thought and behaviour." Furthermore, it must be noted that Bateson (1972, p.170) had also declared that: "The events stream is mediated to [individuals] through language, art, technology, and other cultural media which are structured at every point by tramlines of apperceptive habit."

But, like Zeno's flying arrow (Kowalski, 2012a), the question arises as to how habits are carried forward in time to influence the interactions of individuals in the living present? We are familiar with the idea of programmed behaviour leading to repetition of patterns (Stewart & Joines, 1987) but what and where are these programmes or scripts? Again, Sheldrake's morphic fields (Sheldrake, 1988) have been put forward as a replacement for the traditional hypothesis that memory is contained within the structure or chemistry of the brain, which Stacey (2001, pp.96-97) had captured as: "The shift here is from a notion of past experience being more or less accurately recorded and placed in storage, to past experience shaping current relating processes in the living present with its ever-present spontaneous potential for transformation." This interpretation also fortuitously encompasses Karl Jung's ideas of archetypes and the collective unconscious (Storr, 1998). As a matter of note Sheldrake (1988, pp. 242-243) has maintained that: "as children grow up they come under the influence of various social morphic fields, and tune in to many of the chreodes of the culture".

Hence it seems that we are thrust into a world that has been constructed by cycles of human existence that will shape us to operate within a set of circumstances in largely predetermined ways before we have much opportunity to realise that it has happened, let alone to resist it. Indeed, the essence of the critical realists' argument is that: "Infants are born into social structures and institutions, that is, systems of signs and symbols, or language, that already exist in the sense that they are past rules and relationships that are currently being reproduced by the individual family into which an infant is born." (Stacey, 2001, p.49) Or as Hodgson (2007, p.104) noted: "for any particular actor, social structure *always exists prior* to their engagement with the world." In fact, Stacey (2003, p.5-6) had commented on Hegel's view that: "Person and subject are given content only by the social institutions in which each individual achieves social identity through interdependence and mutual recognition." To

be sure, Bateson (1972, p.170) had commented that: "We are not concerned with a hypothetical isolated individual in contact with an impersonal events stream, but rather with real individuals who have complex emotional patterns of relationship with other individuals". So, we surface as individuals who have been subjected to programming of which we are not particularly aware (which Bateson (1972) called Learning II) and we are already set in 'paths of least resistance' (Fritz, 1994) framed by habits, cultural norms, and identity (individuality). As Yolles (2004, pp. 737-738) noted: "Although people can consciously act to change their social and economic circumstances, critical inquirers recognise that their ability to do so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political domination."

Identity and labelling

Now, identity would appear to be where agency emerges as the being that both experiences and contributes to the shape of the social world, of which poverty and injustice are a part. However, as Stacey (2001, p.168) emphasised: "Identity … is not a thing but a process, continuously reproduced and potentially transformed in the living present." by interaction with others, which is to say it is a relationship. Although, as Bateson (2002, p.44) recognised: "In the transmission of human culture, people always attempt to replicate, to pass on to the next generation the skills and values of the parents; but the attempt always and inevitably fails because cultural transmission is geared to learning", in many ways our future is laid down for us through our temperament and personality, largely determined by our experiences during earliest childhood. Indeed, as Stewart and Joines (1987, p.101) noted: "From a child's earliest days, her parents are giving her messages, on the basis of which she forms conclusions about herself, others and the world. These *script messages* are non-verbal as well as verbal. They form the framework in response to which the child's main script decisions are made." So we learn who we are by the responses we receive from significant adults. Fromm (1995, p.23) recognised this when he maintained that: "[Most people] do not feel themselves worthy because of their own conviction … but because they are approved by others". Furthermore, Ellerman (2001, p.6) has alluded to the rarity of our ability to gain mastery over this process of enculturation when he wrote that: "an individual's self-identity (including the larger social units with which the person identifies) are typically not open to intentional and deliberate choice. One chooses according to who

one is, but one does not directly choose who one is.", which runs counter to what Albert Camus called: "the freedom to be" that is fundamental to an ability to engage in: "a lifetime struggle to achieve authenticity." (Dixon 2009, p.178).

The essence of human existence is that we experience life through our interaction with others. As Vanaerschot (1993, p.55) stated: "Every human being feels the urge to have his existence confirmed by others." and Gaylin (1993, p.181) averred more strongly that: "there can be no person, no 'self', outside the interpersonal context. The human condition, by its very nature, is totally and completely interpersonal." Indeed Sedlacek (2011, p.180) maintained that: "Philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas, and others stand on this side; they *define* human existence on the basis of individuals meeting with other individuals. According to them, only through meeting with another is the notion of the "I exist" born." Significantly Benedict XVI (2009, section 53) suggested that: "the human creature is defined through interpersonal relations. The more authentically he or she lives these relations, the more his or her own personal identity matures. It is not by isolation that man establishes his worth, but by placing himself in relation with others."

Moreover, within development and social work, in addition to the question of how the marginalized are able to strive against those prevailing social structures (PIPs) in which they are immersed, which in many ways determine their social standing, there is a substantial issue regarding the impact that the protagonists can have on the marginalized through the practice of labelling and its accompanying stereotyping. We label people for the sake of convenience and, as Goffman (1968, p.11), in his seminal work on stigma, maintained: "Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories." and that: "The routines of social intercourse in established settings allow us to deal with anticipated others without special attention or thought." (Goffman, op.cit., p.12). Concomitantly, in our dealings with others, we are frequently unaware about how we are categorizing or labelling them or indeed of the impact that such labelling is having upon them. Moreover, Apple (2001, p.261) had noted that: "Labels too often function to confer a lesser status on those labelled. They create categories of deviance that have an essentializing quality to them. The person receiving the label is 'this and *only* this'." As Goffman (op.cit., p.24) pointed out, the stigmatized are acutely aware of their failings in that: "The awareness of inferiority means that one is unable to keep out of consciousness the formulation of some chronic feeling of the worst sort of insecurity, and this means that one suffers anxiety and perhaps even something worse," and Bauman, (2000, p.67) maintained that: "Imperfections of *your* body are *your*

guilt and *your* shame." Furthermore Decimus Lunius Luvenalis had noted that: "Bitter poverty has no harder pang than that it makes men ridiculous" and so, for the subjects of development, being given and/or accepting a label is to be avoided if at all possible.

Thus the marginalized are induced to hide the manifestations of stigma on a daily basis. For, as Goffman (1968, p.57) noted: "The issue is … managing information about his failing. To display or not display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when and where." In addition to the long list of disabilities and deviants, this dilemma can be seen amongst illiterates, women, ethnic groups, in HIV positives, in the unemployed, the homeless and in people who are simply labelled as 'the poor'. This management of stigma is further complicated by the imposed requirement to respond to one's situation and to interact with the agents of 'benevolence' and yet avoid giving endorsement thereby to the labelling bestowed by those significant others. It can be deeply damaging to self-esteem to have to refer to yourself in pejorative terms conferred by the superior power. The stigma and its label become a source of discomfort in a relationship and damage the quality of communication about the substantive issues. Furthermore, the acceptance of the label by both parties leads to another double-bind that ensnares the subjects and protagonists of development interventions for, as Goffman (op. cit., p. 148-149) noted: "Any mutual adjustment and mutual approval between two individuals [such as a partnership] can be fundamentally embarrassed if one of the partners accepts in full the offer that the other appears to make: every 'positive' relationship is conducted under implied promises of consideration and aid such that the relationship would be injured were these credits actually drawn upon." and the 'junior' partner is precluded from commenting upon any shortfalls in the demeanour unaffectedly accorded to them (Carr *et al*, 1998; O'Connor & Kowalski, 2005; Eriksson Baaz, 2005).

The question then becomes where is the locus of control? Appeals for self-determination are fine, but the marginalised are constantly being labelled by others and have to respond through those labels and, given their relative social status, are encouraged to believe them and accept the discredited status of their humanity which the stigma signifies. This in turn can be manifested in inferiority complexes, learned helplessness and fatalism on the part of the marginalized, and as a tendency to patronize and infantilize them by the agents of welfare and development (Carr *et al*, 1998). How can such a relationship form the basis for actions to bring about change that relies substantially upon a change of capability of the marginalized? Which is tantamount to asking how any individual or group can break out of a social structure that has been

responsible for establishing their character, their perceptive field and the terms of their social exchanges? We are all products of the societies that have nurtured us, and before we can reshape those societies we have the challenge of overcoming the restrictions that such upbringing has imposed upon us. For example, Sen (1999, p.284) recognised that: "A child who is denied the opportunity of elementary schooling is not only deprived as a youngster, but also handicapped all through life."

Agents and change

Although Cole (2005, p.49) has suggested that: "Societies develop because individuals choose to act differently, as their social purpose changes with an evolving understanding of their existence" and subsequently maintained that: "The dynamic of the development process being individuals' frustration at being denied the opportunity to realize their emergent potentials, by social forces beyond their control." (Cole 2006, p.343), which Beckhard (1969) had summarised as:

Change will occur when:

$$D \times V \times F > R \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ (1)$$

Where D is dissatisfaction with the current situation (Avoidance motivation)

V is a vision of what is possible as an alternative (Attraction motivation)

F is the perceived feasibility of the first steps necessary to move towards that alternative

R is resistance to change

Nevertheless, the question remains - how can the individual come to influence those social structures so that they can be of and for themselves?

An insight may be garnered from vocational education, in respect of which Lave and Wenger (1991) introduced a concept of 'legitimate peripheral participation' whereby individuals are permitted to attach themselves to a coterie of practitioners, first as observers and then gradually joining in until they become proficient themselves. This may be more familiar as a process of formal apprenticeship, but its relationship to socialization in general can be appreciated in Lave and Wenger's statement that: "children are, after all, quintessentially legit-

imate peripheral participants in adult social worlds" (Lave & Wenger, op.cit., p.32). Clearly, before you can begin to contribute to shaping your community you have to attain a sufficient standing to achieve influence. However, Kant (1991, p.54) had emphasised that: "enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is man's inability to make use of his understanding without the guidance of another". But the guidance of another imprinted in childhood is an inevitable, subliminal leitmotif accompanying all our subsequent actions. Indeed, as Santos (1999, p.39) captured it: "how is it possible to make silence speak without having it necessarily speak the hegemonic language that would have it speak?"

Furthermore, as Ellerman (1995, p.1) expressed it: "A practitioner in any particular field must learn the styles of thought of that discipline. The person must apply himself or herself diligently, making the patterns of thought in the field second nature." Only once a person has been admitted into the ranks of mastery are they permitted to venture criticism, always recognising, with Ellerman (1995, p.30), that: "Societies do not promote to positions of status and influence those individuals who are likely to attack the foundations of the society. And any individuals who aspire to positions of status and influence are unlikely to harbour 'unsound' opinions." Thus a rite of passage process contributes to "a frontier ha[ving] been reached and the person can make an original contribution" (Ellerman 1995, p.1). However, this is precisely the situation where the individual is constrained by their socialization within the existing structures of thought and behaviour, as Damrosch (2006, p.39) noted: "[apprenticeship] subtly reinforces social as well as intellectual conformity". Indeed, Ellerman (1995, p.1) recognised that: "If there are shortcomings, limitations, or mistakes involved in the defining thought patterns of the field, it is unlikely that a normal practitioner would escape them. By the time the person becomes an 'expert' the errors would be second nature. Mastery of the mistaken thought patterns is part of what counts for proficiency and expertise." Beer (2004a, p.789) went further, suggesting that socialization of this kind brings about a process of triage in which the middle socio-economic groupings mistakenly side with the preservation of the *status quo*, which really benefits just the élite and then in the short term only.

When you add onto this the various processes whereby individuals in groups come to behave other than they would if left to their own devices, which Cooke (2001, p.103) listed as: risky shift, the Abilene paradox, group think and coercive persuasion, as well as what Jürgens Habermas captured as the *Weltanschauungen* or ideologies that distort people's ability to reach an unbiased consensus (Servaes, 1996; Finlayson, 2005), then it becomes an even more

challenging prospect for the voice of the marginalised to authentically shape their life-world.

Furthermore, there are dangers to which change agents are subjected, such as those noted by Machiavelli (2005, p.22) who long ago had recognised that: "there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer, than to introduce new political orders. For the one who introduces them has as his enemies all those who profit from the old order, and he has only lukewarm defenders in all those who might profit from the new order." Moreover, Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson (1967, p. 213) maintained that: "A person in [such] a double bind situation is therefore likely to find himself punished (or at least made to feel guilty) for correct perceptions, and defined as 'bad' or 'mad' for even insinuating that there be a discrepancy between what he does see and what he 'should' see." Indeed Scruton (2002, p.114) emphasised that: "social order is a precarious thing, which cannot be sustained by law alone. Internal and external threats to it can be deterred only if people have the mettle to resist them – the force of character, the emotional equilibrium and the live human sympathies that will prompt them to persist in a cause, to make sacrifices, and to commit themselves to others.". Therefore, to be an indigenous change agent from amongst the marginalised is an almost impossibly demanding mission requiring, as it does, both high levels of self-confidence, a thickness of skin and a steely resolve.

Autonomy and self-determination

Now, it is apparent from a number of writers that the concept of development has come to be bound up with that of the promotion of autonomy, whether this is captured in Paul VIth's expression as: "artisans of their destiny" (Paul VI, 1967, section 65); or Korten's theme of: "building their capacity to control their own lives" (Korten, 1983, p.220); or Sen's representation that: "Development can be seen … as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (Sen, 1999, p.3); or, as Ellerman (2005, p.104) emphatically pronounced: "Long-term economic and social transformation grows, in the last analysis, out of autonomous activity. One way or another, a country must find the internal loci of causality necessary for autonomous development." But it is unclear whether these views of autonomy are for individuals, or institutions or communities or any permutation thereof. Indeed, the nominalization that

is 'autonomy' is another instance of the vagueness of language that serves to persuade but not to clarify.

What seems clear is that human social behaviour is manifested in a hierarchy like a set of Chinese boxes ranging from the individual through households to communities, states and ultimately to global institutions such as the United Nations, the Catholic Church or Green Peace. As Beer (1994, p. 115) recognised: "every system demands a metasystem; and therefore a second metasystem will be identified beyond that. There is no logical end to the chain," Importantly Koestler (1967, p.65) asserted that:

> The members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, all have two faces looking in opposite directions: the face turned towards the subordinate levels is that of a self-contained whole; the face turned upward towards the apex, that of a dependent part." and that: "Every holon has a dual tendency to preserve and assert its individuality as a quasi-autonomous whole; and to function as an integrated part of an (existing or evolving) larger whole. This polarity between the Self-Assertive (S-A) and Integrative (INT) tendencies is inherent in the concept of hierarchic order. (Koestler, 1967, p.385).

The balanced interplay between the self-interested pursuits of the individual and the integrative requirements of the higher social order is by no means guaranteed. Hardin (1968, p.1244) was rightly sceptical of placing faith in Adam Smith's invisible hand and its concomitant: "tendency to assume that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society." On the contrary: "we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers." (Hardin, op.cit., p. 1245). Indeed, as Rihani (2002, p. 48) recognised: "The most enduring feature in human societies is a hierarchical structure based upon monopoly of power and wealth by an elite at the top and a concomitant quest by the rest of the community for equity and justice." which has presented every level of social holon with the challenge of determining what for it constitutes social justice and how to bring it about. Beer (1994, p.317) very cogently explained the topsy-turvy nature of élitism when he averred that: "the failure of metasystems in society is due to their conception as higher authorities which cannot conceivably exert that authority in a free society." Indeed Hayek (2007, p.71) maintained that: "The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion,".

This begins to put an entirely different gloss upon the idea of autonomy or freedom, for as Beer (2004a, p.778) emphasised: "Autonomy turns out to mean the maximum discretionary action for the part, short of threatening the

integrity of the whole. This is a non-emotive definition of a very emotive term: freedom." But what is the appropriate level of autonomy? Mill (1974, p.141) had asked: "How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?" and Bauman (2000, p.40) had observed that: "'Society' always stood in an ambiguous relation to individual autonomy: it was, simultaneously, its enemy and its *sine qua non* condition." Indeed, as Pressfield (2002, p.37) reported: "The paradox [of freedom] seems to be, as Socrates demonstrated long ago, that the truly free individual is free only to the extent of his own self-mastery. While those who will not govern themselves are condemned to find masters to govern them." Mohan (2011, p.183) captured the issue succinctly when he maintained that: "The price to be free is unavoidable. If we don't appreciate this paradox, we are doomed to be *unfree* on account of our own lack of *responsibility*.", always remembering with Bauman, (2000, p.36) that: "The 'citizen' is a person inclined to seek her or his own welfare through the well-being of the city – while the individual tends to be lukewarm, sceptical or wary about 'common cause', 'common good', 'good society' or 'just society'." Or as Hinchman (1996, p.488) had observed: "Kant had presumed, … the literal meaning of autonomy: obedience to a self-imposed law." which suggests an internal locus of control, which reins in the pursuit of our individual interests and appetites, that is variously referred to as conscience or responsibility or sense of civic duty. This is the integrative tendency of the holon towards the higher level, not to be confused with identification in which the individual is taken over by the group. Again, Koestler (1967, p.283) maintained that: "An ideal society of this kind could be said to possess 'hierarchic awareness', where every holon on every level is conscious both of its rights as a whole and its duties as a part."

However, Hinchman (1996, p.489) had noted that: "Hegel initiated a transformation that has led to our seeing the autonomous individual as a peculiar kind of historical fiction, one that later became a vehicle of Western cultural imperialism." The culture referred to being free market, liberal capitalism that emphasises individualism above all else whilst crying crocodile tears when confronted with the results of unbridled human appetite, that Epstein (2009, 121) described as: "an operant civil religion of personal responsibility, an ethos of neglect and abandonment in denial of compassion, fairness, or adequacy". Indeed, in 1949 President Truman had announced, with no irony intended, that: "Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressor, but also against their ancient enemies – hunger, misery, and despair." (quoted in Rist, 2002, p.72) and Francis (2002, p. 73), quoting DFID, noted that: "one

of the aims of UK assistance has been to 'spread the values of civil liberties and democracy, rule of law and good governance, and foster the growth of a vibrant and secure civil society.'"

Democracy considered

So the concept of a 'developed' country is increasingly presented as synonymous with a 'democratic' country, and 'development' has been in many ways supplanted by 'democratization'. But, as Mohan (2007, p.94) noted: "democratization is both a euphemism and synonym for Westernization," and Korten (2006, p. 153) emphasised that the ideals of liberal democracy articulated by John Locke: "gave primacy to protecting the natural property rights of the individual" and have been taken up and supported enthusiastically by the enfranchised élites because they: "lent a patina of democracy to their privilege." Throughout the emergence and establishment of current democratic practices societies have been divided between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised which, as Korten (2006, p.146) pointed out, required: "a moral justification for denying the humanity and right of participation of the disenfranchised by exaggerating the virtues of the former and the vices of the latter". The only moral excuse for such a policy of disenfranchisement would be what Korten (2006, p.48) described as a devotion to: "support every individual in negotiating the pathway to a fully mature consciousness." that would lift them all into the ranks of the enfranchised. The response to these shortcomings within our poverty of culture has become the proselytization of democracy but in a most limited form. Indeed, Dahl (2000, p.38) has enunciated five criteria that authenticate a democratic process as one that provides:

> opportunities for:
> 1. Effective participation
> 2. Equality in voting
> 3. Gaining enlightened understanding
> 4. Exercising final control over the agenda
> 5. Inclusion of adults

Which, if they are not yet present, should at least inform policies for social development. That they do not feature more strongly in driving social change can be ascribed to the resistance of oligarchs to the extension of full citizenship (Plato, 1993) based upon their need to preserve free market capitalism. As Hann and Hart (2011, p.117) argued: "We live in self-proclaimed democracies

where all are equally free as a universal principle. Yet we must justify granting some people inferior rights; otherwise functional economic inequalities would be threatened." But these inequalities are not publicly advocated but rather achieved covertly, whether by constitutional exclusion[1], issuing false prospectuses[2], gerrymandering, electoral dirty tricks or illegal vote rigging. But note that this resistance also extends beyond the political arena into employment relations and corporate governance where the oligarchs hold unfettered and unaccountable sway[3], and use those arenas to gain power to subvert the political one.

However, as Easterly (2006, p.105) noted: "democracy is an intricate set of arrangements that is far more than just holding elections." and Crick (2002, p.5) suggested that: "there is democracy as a principle or doctrine of government; there is democracy as a set of institutional arrangements or constitutional devices; and there is democracy as a type of behaviour (say the antithesis of both deference and unsociability)." Furthermore, even when democracy is openly espoused, inescapably government and social institutions result from the interactions of individual people who, if they do not authentically exhibit democratic behaviour, undermine or negate the democratic policies and arrangements that are publicly advocated, which public espousal is then perceived as just so much hypocrisy.

In just this way, because of our imperfect democracy's support for the ascendancy of individual property rights that is the cornerstone of the Western, exploitative, predatory culture, in the words of Roy (1999, p. 10) democracy: "has become little more than a hollow word, a pretty shell, emptied of all content or meaning". Indeed there is something deeply incongruous about the protestations of Western leaders regarding their adherence to the cultural values of freedom (including free markets and property rights) and democracy (predominantly the inalienable right to self-determination). As Dahl (2000, p.173) recognised: "If we approach market capitalism from a democratic point of view we discover, when we look closely, that it has two faces. Like the emblem of the Greek god Janus, they face in opposite directions. One, a friendly face, points towards democracy. The other, a hostile face points the other way." Which is supported by Dani Rodrik's more recent conclusion that free markets

1   Including non-proportional voting systems such as first past the post.
2   Including unequal access to the media for the competing points of view.
3   "The employment contract transfers and alienates the right to control the employee's actions within the scope of the contract to the employer who then exercises that right in his or her own name, not in the name of the employees." (Ellerman,1995, p.32) – so much for the inalienable right to self-determination.

are incompatible with democracy and that: "the cost to society from individual freedom is too high." (Rodrik, 2011 p.120). With deep irony Ellerman (1995, p.5) noted that: "Orthodoxy is blessed with the Happy Consciousness that liberal capitalism has no basic structural violations of human rights and that, far from violating the principles of private property and democracy, it is based upon those principles." Indeed, the current, Western dominated, global culture is manifestly culpable in the lack of peace, the many deprivations that people suffer, the lack of social justice and in the immediate existential threats to humanity (Korten, 2006) not because of its espousal of democracy but because it actually places the provision of Robert Dahl's five opportunities that authenticate a democratic society in the wings rather than giving them centre stage.

In the absence of full democracy what we inevitably have are effectively oligarchies of one sort or another[4], the justification for which is frequently based upon an argument that Dahl (2000, p. 27) refers to as: "the minority of superior competence", otherwise as the rule of the technocrat, which, in the development process, is represented by the external intervention of 'expert', paternalistic agencies and manifested in the domination of *technē* over *phronesis* (Kowalski, 2012b), enthusiasm for which must be curbed by reference to a comment made by Illich (1978, p.79) that: "the professional definition of rights can extinguish liberties and establish a tyranny that smothers people underneath their rights." and Margaret Mead's observation (quoted in Bateson, 1972, p. 160) that: "if we go on defining ends as separate from means *and* apply the social sciences as crudely instrumental means, using the recipes of science to manipulate people, we arrive at a totalitarian rather than a democratic system of life."

Indeed, as Mohan (2011) acknowledged, the original enlightenment project was the emancipation of humanity to achieve its true vocation, that was itself a return to the ideas of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who: "were … less concerned with securing individual rights than with solving the puzzle of how a society might best identify and appoint wise leaders of a mature moral consciousness who would guide the society to achievement of its higher-order possibilities." (Korten, 2006, p.147). However, this has become side-tracked into a less noble undertaking that Epstein (2009, p.121) termed: "a woeful degradation of both human grandeur and civilization's promise" – the pursuit of individual gratification for members of an élite coterie that Korten (2006, p. 57) characterised as: "Cloud Minders", who keep their distance from the lifestyles of the vast majority of human beings. As Diamond (2006, p.520) confirmed: "wealthy

---

4 Traditionally aristocracy, but currently including plutocracy or stratocracy or theocracy.

people increasingly seek to insulate themselves from the rest of society, aspire to create their own separate virtual polders, use their own money to buy services for themselves privately, and vote against taxes that would extend those amenities as public services to everyone else." In my opinion, nothing more clearly exemplifies this capitulation of the agenda for human realization to the forces of individualism within international development than the observation of: "the relocation of ethical/political discourse from the frame of the 'just society' to that of 'human rights'." (Bauman, 2000, p.29). Significantly, Gray (1998, p.109) had maintained that: "Rights have little authority or content in the absence of a common ethical life."

Thus, in the tension between the self-assertive force of the individual and the demands of the integrative force of the social emerges the true paradox of democracy – in the face of alternative social configurations (e.g. an ochlocracy) a democracy can only be sustained by the willingness of individuals to forego their individual interest in favour of the group interest, even to their readiness to lay down their lives to sustain the freedom of others – i.e. altruism. Bauman (2001, p.5) had recognised that: "We cannot be human without both security and freedom; but we cannot have both at the same time and both in quantities which we find fully satisfactory." as seen in the erosion of civil liberties by legislation aimed at curbing acts of terrorism.

The failure of societies to rise to this challenge of the paradox of democracy is captured in the concept of the tragedy of the commons, which Hardin (1968, p.1244) described in the following terms:

> the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Thus we have seen grazing commons joined by open water fisheries, by deforestation, by depredation of endangered species and by environmental pollution; and the list is likely to be extended soon by the exhaustion of petroleum deposits, climate change and the demise of the welfare state (Hardin, 1973; Morrow & Hull, 1996). In response to which Chambers (1997) has called for what he refers to as responsible consumption and the altruism of putting the first last. However, Hardin (1973, p.188) has objected to any notion that voluntary abstention in a commons is practical since: "Nonconscience has a selective ad-

vantage over conscience.", or as Dietz (2005, p.211) put it: "Altruists do poorly, egoists do well, so in the long run altruists are gone from the market," which will inevitably undermine any system that relies upon self-restraint, and Korten (2006, p.35) noted that in our winner-take-all culture: "The high stakes create a powerful incentive to win by any means and exert a strong downward pressure on ethical standards". Furthermore, Hardin (1968, p.1246) is quite clear that to appeal to people's better nature is actually unethical, because: "When we use the word responsibility in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his own interest?" Indeed, Hardin (op.cit., p.1246) surmised that: "Sooner or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has received two communications, and that they are contradictory: (i) (intended communication) "If you don't do as we ask, we will openly condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen"; (ii) (the unintended communication) "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons."" This led Hardin (op.cit., p.1247) to advocate that the solution is for every commons to be underpinned by a system of governance of resources founded upon coercion: "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." so that with the power to consume comes the unrelieved consequences of being accountable, as Hardin (1973, p.189) concluded: "We must take the next step in evolution and bring power and responsibility together once more, this time in the community."

Nevertheless, things may not be quite so clear cut. On the one hand there is the difficulty of devising systems of coercion. As Hardin (1968, pp.1244-1245) noted: "The allocation [of rights of access] might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable." To which can be added the issue of oversight of the enforcement of the regulations with the age old reductio *ad absurdum* of "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?" and the creation of rent seeking opportunities. On the other hand, and in contrast to Mohan's (2011, p.58) remark that: "From Wall Street to Rwanda, the gluttony of greed and gloom has produced a widespread dysfunctionality that thwarts all democratic institutions.", we must take note of Easterly's (2006, p.77) assertion that: "predation [of the weak by the strong] doesn't happen as often as this theory [the prisoners' dilemma] predicts, even without a policeman looking over your shoulder." Orr (2004, p.169) also commented that: "Evidence shows that we are in fact considerably more public spirited than we have been led to believe," and

Latouche's (2003, p.3) observation that: "the experts tear their hair out when they meet herders who really do not see the need to increase their flocks beyond what is necessary, just to make money." which must give us some grounds for optimism that there is some part of the human population that holds values that are in line with the humanization agenda (either consciously or not) that Mohan (2011) has called Enlightenment II.

However, because in general we lack the maturity to govern ourselves but abdicate government to our representatives, who themselves are dependent upon pleasing us, we have created a self-referential, paradoxical relationship that cannot take a systemic view of what is truly in our collective interests. The current failure to achieve authentic democracy has resulted in a political system that is bound to the principle of expediency and as Bateson (1972, p.442) recognised: "expediency will never give a long-term solution". Furthermore, Diamond (2006, p.496) has drawn attention to the sleight of mouth that is the American dream in that: "no one in First World governments is willing to acknowledge the dream's impossibility: the unsustainability of a world in which the Third World's large population were to reach and maintain current First World living standards." which has generated and impels the current development agenda that is termed Sustainable Development.

Concluding Remarks

The theme that, for me, emerges most strongly from consideration of this latest paradox of development is that of the part-to-whole relationship. It is Zeno's arrow once more where we are misled into thinking the individual is separate from society. We are lured into noun (and pronoun) thinking instead of thinking about relationships and verbs. To think about individuals as in some way separate from social structures is to reify both when what every day experience suggests is that there is an integrating transcendence between these two logical levels. The individual is free to choose, but their choice is not free to be made without reference to society and relationships. Once more the paradox of the Gift has its parallel manifestation in wider social relations (Kowalski, 2011).

The importance of such hierarchical linkage is reflected in the concept of the metasystem, of something that is greater or beyond the parochial human condition. As Yolles (p.730) noted:

> In the context of the human being, like Beer, De Bono relates the concept
> of the metasystem to the social community when he suggests that without

> the metasystem a person would act according to its own personal systems, which might be based on immediate gratification, self-indulgence and impulse. Thus, the metasystem lies outside individual systems and overrides these factors in favour of society and a longer time base.

Indeed, De Bono (1990, p.25) himself had commented that it is: "the metasystem which tells him that in the long term such behaviour will not be in his best interests or, if this seems untrue, in the best interests of society as a whole." Furthermore, it is the obstinate insistence on the importance of the self/other boundary that can be seen to be a principle characteristic of western culture (Holdstock, 1993). Thus we must question the extent to which the problems of development and sustainability are products of that masculine, materialistic, individualistic western culture (Korten, 2006) that has spawned capitalism and from which the majority of development interventions are initiated.

Beer (2004b, pp.824-5) stated that: "New initiatives are needed that embody principles learned from cultures other than the dominant culture of the West, from philosophies other than materialism, from methodologies other than reductionism. Moreover, we have loved our technology not wisely but too well …" and Espejo (2004, p.676) noted:

> the ethical/political discourse of collectivists was that of a "just society", and of individualists was that of individual "human rights" … , we need at present a participatory discourse focused more precisely on the constitution of fair societies that recognise individuals with rights and responsibilities, that is of societies and organisations that recognise the difference between individuals and citizens.

Acknowledgements

Works cited

Apple, M.W. (2001) The politics of Labeling in a Conservative Age. In G.M. Hudak and P. Kihn (Eds.) *Labeling: Pedagogy and Politics.* pp.261- 283. New York: RoutledgeFalmer.

Archer, M.S. (1995) *Realist social theory: the morphogenetic approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aronowitz, S. (1993) Paulo Freire's Radical Democratic Humanism, in McLaren, P. and P. Leonard, (eds.), *Paulo Freire : a critical encounter*, pp. 8-24. London: Routledge.

Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. London: Paladin.

Bateson, G. (2002) Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Bauman, Z. (2000) *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. (2001) *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beckhard, R. (1969) *Organization Development: Strategies and Models*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Beer, S. (1994) *Platform for Change*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Beer, S. (2004a) World in Torment: A Time Whose Idea Must Come. *Kybernetes* 33 (3/4), 774-803

Beer, S. (2004b) Man in a garrulous silence. *Kybernetes* 33 (3/4), 809-827.

Benedict XVI 2009. *Caritas in Veritate*. Encyclical letter. Vatican: Libreria Editrice http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html accessed on 8/10/2010

Benton, T. (1981) "Objective" Interests and the Sociology of Power. *Sociology* 15 (2), 161-184.

Bhaskar, R. (2002) *From Science to Emancipation: Alienation and the Actuality of Enlightenment*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Carney, D. (1998) *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What contributions can we make?* London: Department for International Development.

Carr, S., McAuliffe, E. & MacLachlan, M. (1998) *Psychology of Aid*. London: Routledge.

Chambers, R. (1997) *Whose reality counts? : putting the first last*. London: Intermediate Technology.

Clegg, S.R., (1989) *Frameworks of Power*. London: Sage Publications.

Cole, K. (2005) The last putting themselves first. *Progress in Development Studies* 5, (1) 45–53.

Cole, K. (2006) The last putting *themselves* first III: progress, intuition and development studies. *Progress in Development Studies* 6, (4) 343–349.

Cooke, W. (2001) The Social Psychological Limits of Participation? In Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.), *Participation the New Tyranny?* pp. 102-122. London: Zed Books.

Craib, I. (1992) *Anthony Giddens*. London: Routledge.

Crick, B. (2002) *Democracy: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University press.

Dahl, R.A. (2000) *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Damrosch, D. (2006) Vectors of Change. In C.M. Golde & G.E. Walker (eds.) *Envisioning the Future of Doctoral Education: Preparing Stewards of the Discipline*. Carnegie Essays on the Doctorate (pp. 34-45). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

De Bono, E. (1977) *The Happiness Purpose*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.

Diamond, J. (2006) *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive*. London: Penguin

Books.

Dietz, T. (2005) The Darwinian trope in the drama of the commons: variations on some themes by the Ostroms. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 57, 205–225.

Dixon, J. (2009) Comparative social welfare: the existential humanist perspective and challenge. *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare* 26 (2-3), 177-187.

Easterly, W. (2006) *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Einstein, A. 1998: Why socialism. Monthly Review May. Retrieved 4 August 2004 from http://www.monthlyreview.org/598mill.htm

Ellerman, D.P. (1995) *Intellectual Trespassing as a Way of Life: Essays in Philosophy, Economics, and Mathematics*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Ellerman, D.P. (2001) "Helping people help themselves: Towards a theory of Autonomy-compatible help", *World Bank Working paper* 2693. http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=2513 accessed 28 April 2003.

Ellerman, D.P. (2005) *Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Epstein, W.M. (2009) Romanticism, community and social services. *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare* 26 (2-3), 117-136.

Eriksson Baaz, M. (2005) *The Paternalism of Partnership*. London: Zed Books.

Espejo, R. (2004) The footprint of complexity: the embodiment of social systems. *Kybernetes* 33 (3/4), 671-700

Finlayson, J.G. (2005). *Habermas: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Francis, P. (2002) Social Capital, Civil Society and Social Exclusion. In U. Kothari, & M. Minogue, (eds.) *Development theory and practice: critical perspectives*. pp.71-91. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Freire, P. (1971) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fritz, R. (1994) *The Path of Least Resistance*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heineman.

Fromm, E. (1995) *The essential Fromm : life between having and being*, London: Constable.

Gaylin, N.L. (1993) Person Centred Family Therapy. In D.Brazier, (ed.), *Beyond Carl Rogers,* pp.181-200. London: Constable.

Giddens, A. (1982) *Profiles and critiques in social theory*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Giddens, A. (1989) A reply to my critics. In Held, D. & Thompson, J.B. (eds.) *Social theory of modern societies: Antony Giddens and his critics.* pp. 249-301. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goffman, E. (1968) *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. London: Penguin Books.

Gray, J. (1998) *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*. New York: The New Press.

Hann, C. & Hart, K. (2011) *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162, 1243-1248.

Hardin, G. (1973) *Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle*. New York: Pelican Books.

Hayek, F.A. (2007) *The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents*. The Definitive Edition.

B. Caldwell (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hinchman, L. (1996) Autonomy, Individuality, and Self-Determination. In J. Schmidt (Ed.), *What Is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*. pp.488-516. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hirschman, A.O. (1992) *Rival Views of Market Society*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Hodgson, G.M. (2007). Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and Evolution. *Organization Studies* 28 (1), 95 – 116.

Holdstock, L. (1993) Can We Afford not to Revision the Person-Centred Concept of Self? In D. Brazier, (ed.), *Beyond Carl Rogers*, pp.229-252. London: Constable.

Illich, I. (1978) *The Right to Useful Employment: and its professional enemies*. London: Marion Boyars.

Kant, I. (1991) *Kant: Political Writings*. Second, Enlarged Edition. Edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koestler, A. (1967) *The Ghost in the Machine*. London: Pan Books.

Korten, D. C. (1983) Social Development: putting people first. In *Bureaucracy and the Poor: closing the gap*. D.Korten & F.Alfonso (eds.) pp. 201-221, West Hartford: Kumerian

Korten, D. C. (2006) *The Great Turning: From Empire to Earth Community*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.

Kowalski, R. (1994) The teaching of Agricultural Economics, Farm and Agri-business Management in Polish Universities - Quo Vadis? In E. Majewski & G. Entwhistle (eds.), "*Changes in the teaching of Economic subjects in Agricultural Universities*". pp. 26-32. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo SGGW

Kowalski, R. (2004). Development – Paradox, paralysis and praxis. *Protosociology* 20, 390 – 411.

Kowalski, R. (2005) On Terrorism and the Politics of Compulsion. *World Futures* 61(3), 188 – 198.

Kowalski, R. (2007). Reflections on the role of logical frameworks in the management of development assistance. *International Journal of Management Practice*, 2 (4), 297 – 305.

Kowalski, R. (2010) The Phenomenology of Development. *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare*. 26 (2-3), 153-164.

Kowalski, R. (2011) The Gift – Marcel Mauss and International Aid. *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare*. 27 (3), 189-205.

Kowalski, R. (2012a) Paradox and Logical Types in Social Enterprises. In Georg Peter & Reuss-Markus Krausse (Eds.) *Neue Grenzen des Sozialen. Zwischen Globalisierung, Erkenntnis und Ästhetik* pp. 197-213. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Kowalski, R. (2012b) International Development, Paradox and Phronesis. *Protosociology* 29, 183-205.

Latouche, S. (2003) Sustainable Development as a paradox. Paper given at a Symposium of the Religion, Science and the Environment Movement on the Baltic Sea, June Retrieved 4 August 2004 from http://www.rsesymposia.org/themedia/File/1151679499-Plenary2_Latouche.pdf

Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991) *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, O. (1964) *The Children of Sanchez*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Machiavelli, N. (2005) *The Prince*. Translated and Edited by Peter Bondanella. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

May, R. (1974) *Power and Innocence*. London: Souvenir Press.

Mill, J.S. (1974) *On Liberty*. London: Penguin Books.

Mohan, B. (2007) Fallacies of Development: Crises of Human and Social Development. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors.

Mohan, B. (2011) *Development, Poverty of Culture, and Social Policy*. New York: Palgrave Press.

Morrow, C.E. & Hull, R.W. (1996) Donor-Initiated Common Pool Resource Institutions: The Case of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative. *World Development* 24 (10), 1641-1657.

O'Connor, S. & Kowalski, R. (2005) On Twinning: The Impact of Naming an EU Accession Programme on the Effective Implementation of its Projects. *Public Administration and Development* 25, 437-443.

Ollman, B. (1993) *Dialectical investigations*. London: Routledge.

Orr, D.W. (2004) *Earth in Mind: On Education, Environment, and the Human Prospect*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Paul VI (1967) *Populorum Progressio* Encyclical letter. Vatican: Libreria Editrice. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html accessed on 6/9/10

Plato (1993) *The Republic*. (trans. R Waterfield). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pressfield, S. (2002) *The war of art*. New York, NY: Grand Central Publ.

Rahnema, M. (1992) Participation. In W. Sachs (ed.) *The Development Dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power*. pp. 116-131. London: Zed Books.

Rihani, S. (2002) *Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: understanding non-linear realities*. London, Zed Books.

Rist, G. (2002). *The History of Development*, (new edition), London: Zed Books.

Rodrik, D. (2011) *The Globalization Paradox: Why global markets, states and democracy can't coexist*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roy, A. (1999) *The Cost of Living*. New York: The Modern Library.

Santos, B. de Sousa (1999) On Oppositional Postmodernism. In *Critical Development Theory*, Ronaldo Munck & Denis O'Hearn (eds.). pp.29-43. Dhaka: The University Press.

Scruton, R. (1996). *An intelligent person's guide to Philosophy*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Seabrook, J. (1988) *The Race for Riches: The Human Cost of Wealth*. Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering.

Searle, J.R. (1995) *The Construction of Social Reality*. London: Penguin

Sedlacek, T. (2011) *Economics of Good and Evil: The quest for economic meaning from Gilgamesh to Wall Street*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Servaes, J. (1996) Participatory Communication Research with New Social Movements: a Realistic Utopia. In J. Servaes, T.L. Jacobson, & S. A. White (eds.) *Participatory Communication for Social Change*. pp. 82-108. New Dehli: Sage.

Sheldrake, R. (1988) *The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance & The Habits of Nature*.

Rochester, Vermont: Park Street Press.

Stacey, R. (2001) *Complex Responsive Processes in Organizations: Learning and Knowledge Creation*. London: Routledge.

Stacey, R. (2003) Learning as an Activity of Interdependent People. *The Learning Organization* 10 (6), 1-10.

Stacey, R. & Griffin, D. (2005) *A Complexity Perspective on Researching Organizations*. London: Routledge.

Stewart, I. & Joines, V.S. (1987) *TA Today: A new introduction to Transactional Analysis*. Nottingham: Lifespace Publishing.

Storr, A. (1998) *The Essential Jung: Selected Writings*. London: Fontana Press.

Tendler, J. (1975) *Inside Foreign Aid*. London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Vanaerschot, G. (1993) Empathy as Releasing Several Micro-Processes in the Client. In D.Brazier, (Ed.), *Beyond Carl Rogers*, pp.47-71. London: Constable.

Watzlawick, P., Bavelas, J.B. & Jackson, D.D. (1967). *Pragmatics of Human Communication*. London: W W Norton & Company.

Yolles, M. (2004) Implications for Beer's ontological system/metasystem dichotomy. *Kybernetes* 33 (3/4), 726-764.

Prof. Dr. Robert Kowalski

Instituto Socioambiental e dos Recursos Hídricos,

Belém, Pará, Brazil.

Email:bandb.kowalski@btopenworld.com